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Abstract
Background: This article centers around a proposal outlining how research universities could
leverage their intellectual property to help close the access gap for health innovations in poor
countries. A recent deal between Emory University, Gilead Sciences, and Royalty Pharma is used
as an example to illustrate how 'equitable access licensing' could be put into practice.
Discussion: While the crisis of access to medicines in poor countries has multiple determinants,
intellectual property protection leading to high prices is well-established as one critical element of
the access gap. Given the current international political climate, systemic, government-driven
reform of intellectual property protection seems unlikely in the near term. Therefore, we propose
that public sector institutions, universities chief among them, adopt a modest intervention – an
Equitable Access License (EAL) – that works within existing trade-law and drug-development
paradigms in order to proactively circumvent both national and international obstacles to generic
medicine production. Our proposal has three key features: (1) it is prospective in scope, (2) it
facilitates unfettered generic competition in poor countries, and (3) it centers around universities
and their role in the biomedical research enterprise. Two characteristics make universities ideal
agents of the type of open licensing proposal described. First, universities, because they are
upstream in the development pipeline, are likely to hold rights to the key components of a wide
variety of end products. Second, universities acting collectively have a strong negotiating position
with respect to other players in the biomedical research arena. Finally, counterarguments are
anticipated and addressed and conclusions are drawn based on how application of the Equitable
Access License would have changed the effects of the licensing deal between Emory and Gilead.
Background
Last year, Emory University, Gilead Sciences, and Royalty
Pharma announced a deal in which Emory sold its 20%
royalty interest in the antiretrovirals Emtriva (emtricitab-
ine, FTC) and Truvada (emtricitabine+tenofovir,
FTC+TDF) to Gilead and Royalty Pharma for an up-front
payment of $525 million [1]. The deal – in essence, a
renegotiation of an earlier licensing agreement – reflected
the demonstrated value of emtricitabine, a compound dis-
covered by Emory researchers and patented by the univer-
sity. On the surface, this deal seems like a boon for all
parties involved: the university receives a wealth of unre-
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stricted funds, while Gilead extends its control over mar-
keting and distributing the drugs.
A closer look suggests that the deal was a missed opportu-
nity for the university to collaborate with its licensee to
assure not only high licensing revenues, but global access
to the products of its innovation as well. Emtricitabine
and tenofovir are likely to be recommended for both first-
line and second-line therapy in updated World Health
Organization antiretroviral treatment guidelines, making
access to these medications increasingly important for
millions of people with HIV across the world, particularly
in poor countries [2]. Yet the terms of the deal did not
address access to these medicines.
Gilead is among the most advanced among pharmaceuti-
cal companies in implementing efforts to address ques-
tions of access in poor countries, known in particular for
its Access Program. But even this well-intentioned
approach is not free of limitations. For example, those
administering antiretroviral treatment on the ground in
poor countries have pointed out endemic problems with
the Access Program, such as failure to register the drugs in
the countries purportedly eligible to receive a discount on
the drugs [3]. Moreover, Emtriva is not currently included
in Gilead's Access Program [4]. The $525 million deal
with Emory University raises the question of whether
Emory, as a university dedicated to serving the public
interest, could have acted further to improve access to the
products of its innovation. This article centers around a
proposal outlining how Emory, and other universities in
its position, could engage their licensees in an effort to
close the access gap for health innovations, such as
Gilead's antiretrovirals, based on discoveries at those uni-
versities.
Discussion
1. Intellectual property rights and access to medicines
Barriers impeding access to Truvada and Viread (and
Emtriva) are indicative of a larger problem that impedes
access to other medicines as well. Approximately ten mil-
lion people die needlessly each year because they lack
access to existing essential medicines and vaccines [5].
This "access gap" stems from several factors, including
unreliable health care delivery systems, lack of political
will for public financing of health care, and high prices for
medicines [6]. These factors are mutually reinforcing, par-
ticularly in poor countries, as patients in poor countries
pay on average more than seventy percent of medicine
costs themselves [7].
High prices result in large part from the temporary
monopolies granted to pharmaceutical companies
through patent and regulatory systems [8]. In fact, generic
competition may be the most important factor in lower-
ing prices in a given country [9]. Importantly, increased
generic competition in poor countries is unlikely to signif-
icantly impact the revenues of patent-based pharmaceuti-
cal companies and thereby impede future innovation. The
branded pharmaceutical industry in the United States
derives only five to seven percent of its profits from all
low- and middle-income (LMI) countries [10].
Some authors have argued that pharmaceutical compa-
nies rarely patent in poor countries and that intellectual
property protection has little relation to access [11]. Yet
there is widespread evidence that pharmaceutical compa-
nies do seek patents in poor countries [12]. For instance,
many of the most important antiretrovirals for HIV treat-
ment are widely patented in Africa [13]. Moreover, patents
in key source countries for generics – for example, India –
may affect access to generics in countries where no patents
exist, because many developing countries have little or no
capacity to produce medicines locally.
It appears that things will get worse before they get better
[14]. India passed legislation in March of 2005 to comply
with the World Trade Organization's Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement,
jeopardizing the world's most important supply of generic
medicines. Additionally, the United States continues to
pressure developing countries to adopt so-called "TRIPS-
plus" standards in its bilateral free trade agreements.
These standards extend monopoly rights for medicines,
impede generic competition, and make importing generic
drugs from other countries even more difficult.
There have been some positive developments in the arena
of intellectual property and health. Most notably, in May
2006, the World Health Assembly passed resolution
WHA59.24, which created an intergovernmental working
group to develop a global plan of action on intellectual
property, innovation, and public health. While this is
undoubtedly a useful initial step, true reform of intellec-
tual property protection can only be achieved through
domestic, government-driven reform or binding interna-
tional agreements along the lines of the TRIPS regime. Dif-
ficulties implementing the public health protections
under TRIPS – as well as the United States' stance toward
intellectual property and health in bilateral trade negotia-
tions – indicate that such reforms will be halting at best in
the current political climate [14]. Moreover, given the
pharmaceutical industry's dependence on university
research, universities will likely continue to license their
patent stakes in medical products for cash payments and
royalties. Therefore, we propose that public sector institu-
tions, universities chief among them, adopt a modest
intervention – an Equitable Access License (EAL) – that
works within existing trade-law and drug-development
paradigms in order to proactively circumvent bothGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:1 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/1
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national and international obstacles to generic medicine
production.
Our proposal has three key features: (1) it is prospective
in scope, (2) it facilitates unfettered generic competition
in poor countries, and (3) it centers around universities
and their role in the biomedical research enterprise. The
open licensing mechanism we propose complements
more systematic efforts to reform the international intel-
lectual property regime. It is a policy change that can be
implemented in the near term by a different set of leaders
– university administrators rather than political represent-
atives. Indeed, we believe part of the utility of implement-
ing our proposal will be the united voice of universities
signaling to governments that they have not sufficiently
addressed a humanitarian crisis. The details of this pro-
posal have been laid out elsewhere [15]; the purpose of
this paper is to describe the key components of a univer-
sity licensing structure that would facilitate access to med-
icines in developing countries.
2. The case for university action
University research is integral to the biomedical research
and development pipeline. This gives universities the
power to act to improve the lives of patients – and also to
collectively persuade their private sector partners of the
mutual benefits of an open licensing approach. Further,
the institutional principles of universities – to create and
disseminate knowledge that improves people's lives – are
well-aligned with the objectives of our proposal. Each of
the top four recipients of US patents in 2004, including
two private universities, the California Institute of Tech-
nology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
cites public benefit as an explicit goal in its patent policy
[16].
Multiple studies have confirmed that public sector
research, including research done at universities, is vital to
the development of new medicines [17-19]. A US Senate
Joint Economic Committee study concluded that the con-
tribution of universities and other public research institu-
tions was instrumental in developing fifteen of the
twenty-one drugs considered by experts to have had the
highest therapeutic impact [20]. Universities have held US
patent rights in a wide array of key pharmaceuticals,
including the cancer drugs cisplatin and carboplatin,
pemetrexed (Alimta), cetuximab (Erbitux); the anemia
treatment epoetin alfa (Epogen); the AIDS drugs stavu-
dine (Zerit), 3TC (Epivir), abacavir (Ziagen), and T20
(Fuzeon); and the best-selling glaucoma medicine latano-
prost (Xalatan) [15].
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave US universities control
over intellectual property resulting from federally-funded
research. Typically, universities license biomedical tech-
nologies to private sector companies for further develop-
ment. Therefore, while universities often hold intellectual
property rights to key components of many end products
on the market – licensees, usually biotechnology or phar-
maceutical companies, generally acquire secondary pat-
ents and generate the safety and efficacy data needed to
market the drug. Nevertheless, two characteristics make
universities ideal agents of an open licensing proposal.
First, universities, because they are upstream in the devel-
opment pipeline, are likely to hold rights to the key com-
ponents of a wide variety of end products. Second,
universities acting collectively have a strong negotiating
position with respect to other players in the biomedical
research arena.
3. The equitable access license
The open licensing approach
The ultimate goal of our proposal is to achieve marginal
cost pricing for health-related end products, including
medicines and medical devices, in low- and middle-
income countries [21]. To achieve this, we propose that
universities' technology transfer agreements facilitate
generic competition by providing open licenses guaran-
teeing third-party manufacturers the right to compete in
LMI markets, regardless of patents or other forms of exclu-
sive rights.
While a 'fair pricing' approach – obliging the original
manufacturer to make a medicine available at a low
markup on marginal cost of production – might seem like
a plausible (or even preferable) alternative to an open
licensing approach, it would require a credible threat of
enforcement for breach of contract. The open licensing
approach, on the other hand, does not require universities
to take an active role in monitoring or enforcement. It
achieves this by introducing third parties (generics com-
panies) with market incentives to narrow the access gap by
offering low-priced, but still profitable, products. Addi-
tionally, the balance of the evidence – most clearly seen in
the case of HIV antiretrovirals – indicates that competi-
tion has been more reliable as a method of lowering prices
than voluntary "at cost" pricing [22,23].
Finally, an open licensing approach fosters more sustain-
able and locally appropriate supplies of low-cost medi-
cines in developing countries. A small but meaningful
market would attract the investment by low-margin
generic companies. Similarly, our proposal seeks to allow
third parties to modify products for the particular needs of
target populations via fixed dose combinations or pediat-
ric dosing.
Appropriate technologies and territories
To be appropriate for an Equitable Access License, a tech-
nology must be health-related. However, universitiesGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:1 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/1
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should resist the pervasive assumption that access con-
cerns in developing countries are limited to drugs for
infectious diseases. The burden of chronic non-communi-
cable disease is primarily borne by those living in devel-
oping countries [24]. Meanwhile, the equitable access
approach should be well-suited to a wide variety of tech-
nologies, from small-molecule drugs and macromole-
cules to diagnostic and manufacturing tools. The most
obvious candidates are potential pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, both small-molecule drugs and biologic therapies.
We contend that, in order to meet the health needs of
patients in developing countries, EAL provisions must
apply to all low- and middle-income (LMI) countries (as
defined by the World Bank) and must include the right to
supply the private sector in these countries [25]. Middle-
income countries (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa)
are included for their highly unequal income distribu-
tions and large poor populations that must obtain their
own care in the private sector [26]. Moreover, middle-
income countries are critical as incentives to sustain the
generic manufacturers. Finally, any entity that wishes to
supply a LMI market – even a company based in a high-
income country – would able to do so under the EAL.
Mechanism of the EAL
The mechanism of operation for the EAL can be summa-
rized in three steps: (1) cross-licensing and grant back of
rights between the university and a licensee; (2) notifica-
tion by a third party of intent to supply an LMI market,
triggering the provisions of the EAL; and (3) grant back of
rights for any subsequent developments made by the third
party to the university. These steps are described in Figure
1 below.
The first step is essentially an exchange of licenses. Just as
with a normal exclusive licensing transaction, the univer-
sity grants the licensee rights to a particular innovation.
This grant will likely include, at a minimum, rights to
practice the university's technology in some or all high-
income countries. In exchange, the licensee will "grant
back" to the university a set of rights referred to as "asso-
ciated rights"; this would include all of the potentially
exclusive rights the company holds or acquires that could
prevent a third party from producing or delivering an end
product. The EAL's provisions must apply to any technol-
ogies necessary to the production of the end product even
if those technologies are not directly related to the univer-
sity's innovation.
Schematic diagram of the mechanism of the Equitable Access License Figure 1
Schematic diagram of the mechanism of the Equitable Access License. The three phases of the Equitable Access 
License.Globalization and Health 2007, 3:1 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/1
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However, the grant back would not include any material
property – such as cell lines – possessed by the original
licensee or sub-licensees. Importantly, the EAL's provi-
sions are designed to apply not only to the initial licensee
but also to any subsequent sub-licensees. The university
obtains these rights solely for the purpose of granting an
automatic sub-license to any third-party manufacturer,
thereby ensuring freedom to operate in LMI countries.
The second transactional element of the EAL is a simple
notification procedure: a third party notifies both the uni-
versity and the original licensee that it intends to make,
use, or sell the end product in a LMI market. We anticipate
three main types of third-party notifiers: (1) generics com-
panies wishing to produce or sell in an LMI country; (2)
government agencies or NGOs wishing to import generics
from a third party; or (3) researchers wishing to adapt an
end product to developing-country use. In order to foster
an open and competitive environment, the EAL permits
multiple notifiers. Upon notification, the university's
licensed rights, including associated rights from the licen-
see, flow to the third-party manufacturer. Through this
contractual flow of rights, patent, regulatory, and manu-
facturing barriers are lifted for the notifying entity.
In keeping with the spirit of the Bayh-Dole Act, the EAL
requires notifiers to pay a small royalty to both the univer-
sity and the biotechnology company. This has the added
benefit of offering a revenue stream to all parties imple-
menting the EAL. For low-income countries, we propose
that the royalty be set at a rate within the lower part of the
range recommended by the United Nations Development
Programme of zero to six percent of sales [26]. For mid-
dle-income countries, we propose a slightly higher flat
rate (e.g., five percent). The license will have to establish
an equitable division of royalties between the university
and the licensee.
The EAL also permits notifiers in any country to engage in
research to improve an end product, for example, to adapt
a technology to local circumstances. The final step of the
EAL licenses any such improvements back to the univer-
sity for the sole purpose of sublicensing them under the
EAL's terms. In other words, any improvements made by
a notifier would themselves be subject to the terms of the
EAL, entitling them to royalties for the use of its improve-
ments in LMI markets, but restricting them from prevent-
ing others from exploiting these improvements.
4. Feasibility
The unique appeal of the Equitable Access License is that
it promotes true generic competition in LMI countries
while requiring minimal oversight. Nevertheless, we
anticipate that the feasibility of our proposal will raise a
number of doubts, three of which we attempt to address
here.
Diversion
It may be argued that generic end products resulting from
EAL pricing regimes could find their way into high-
income countries, threatening pharmaceutical compa-
nies' sales there. However, our approach actually reduces
the risk that generic medicines would be diverted to mar-
kets in high-income countries compared to a drug-dona-
tion or fair-pricing approach. Differentially priced
products sold by the original, branded company may be
susceptible to parallel trade, though regulatory barriers
prevent these medicines from entering high-income mar-
kets easily. Generic versions of the same medicines must
overcome a second barrier governed by patent law and
enforced through customs procedures. Licensees may
express disquiet about the possibility of generic products
entering high-income markets illegally. However, there is
no empirical evidence of any substantial flows of medi-
cine from LMI countries to high-income countries [12].
Insofar as this is a concern, EAL signatories can address it
as the WTO has – by requiring different packaging, pill
color, and pill shape in different countries to facilitate
identification of illegal imports [27].
Diverse technologies
With some technologies, such as biologics, materials (e.g.,
cell lines for producing monoclonal antibodies) may be
essential to the production of an end product. These can-
not be transferred in our simple open licensing approach.
In principle, an EAL license could seek to bind a licensee
to provide the necessary materials; however, such arrange-
ments would require the university to provide credible
threat of legal enforcement in case a licensee violated the
agreement, sacrificing much of the EAL's ease of use. The
EAL might instead require negotiations between all parties
if transfer of materials is requested. If some enforcement
mechanism becomes inevitable, one solution might be to
create a standing inter-university body charged with mon-
itoring equitable access licenses. Such a body might be
modeled on a similar initiative in agriculture known as
the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA), a multi-university collaboration for the manage-
ment of intellectual property associated with agricultural
development [28]. Additionally, governments are still
deciding how to regulate bioequivalence and generic pro-
duction of biologics. Since the EAL relies upon generic
competition for efficient price reduction, its applicability
remains dependent upon the regulatory framework sur-
rounding the approval of generics.
Effect on universities
University administrators and directors of technology
transfer may doubt the financial viability of the EAL. TheGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:1 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/1
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data not only suggests its viability, but that it could yield
a net gain for universities. Licensing revenues typically
account for only four percent of university research funds
– and this figure decreases significantly when the costs of
patenting, license management and the inventors' share
of royalty income are subtracted [29]. Further, university
revenue from developing country markets, even on a
blockbuster drug, would be vanishingly small. Under the
EAL, however, universities stand to gain a small but signif-
icant revenue stream from its share on royalties from end
products that would otherwise not be sold in LMI coun-
tries.
The pharmaceutical industry's increasing dependence on
external research, suggests that universities can promote
access without abandoning their partnerships with phar-
maceutical companies, reducing their income, or jeopard-
izing the viability of technology transfer operations [30].
This is particularly true if universities act collectively.
While pharmaceutical companies will likely resist any
changes to the status quo, if major research institutions act
together, potential licensees will be more amenable to the
EAL. While an individual university may be dispensable to
the pharmaceutical industry, universities as a whole are
not. Such collective action on the part of universities has
a precedent in the PIPRA project, showing that when the
need arises, universities can be quite willing to work coop-
eratively to ensure access to intellectual property.
5. Conclusion
It is worth summarizing how the EAL's provisions differ
from potential alternative solutions. First, a contractual
obligation that would require pharmaceuticals or biotech-
nologies to be sold at marginal cost means little if there is
no mechanism that defines marginal cost, monitors
prices, and enforces breaches in the contract. Neither uni-
versities nor pharmaceutical companies are likely to vol-
unteer the infrastructure needed to enforce such an
agreement. The EAL surmounts this problem through a
self-implementing mechanism that requires little moni-
toring or administrative oversight.
Second, access provisions could specify an agreement not
to enforce a university's patents in a pre-determined set of
developing countries. Such access provisions would not
require that the company with the license give up its rights
in those countries; therefore, the company would still be
able to use any of its own patents (e.g., on formulations,
processes, dosages) or its rights to clinical trial data to
exclude generics companies. The EAL sidesteps this diffi-
culty by capturing any "improvements" in a licensed tech-
nology within the purview of its terms.
Finally, if access provisions were to be negotiated on a
case by case basis, licensees would likely veto inclusion of
those provisions in cases where they might be most useful
in improving access. This problem can only be solved by
making certain access provisions uniform across numer-
ous universities, and, except in extreme circumstances,
non-negotiable.
Emory could have included EAL-like provisions in its orig-
inal license with Gilead to ensure access beyond the com-
pany's Access Program. It missed a second chance in the
royalty buyout negotiated with Gilead and Royalty
Pharma earlier this year. While the administration cele-
brated the royalty transaction as an unparalleled boon for
Emory, the truth is that the university signed a raw deal.
Emory could have received the same $525 million pay-
ment and ensured access to Emtriva and Truvada to mil-
lions of patients in developing countries. The reason for
this is simple: those patients are not currently able to
afford the drugs that they so desperately need and there-
fore factor into neither Gilead's revenue nor (by exten-
sion) Emory's royalties.
Universities will undoubtedly put their royalty payments
to good use; most likely at least some of these funds will
be reinvested in health sciences research. This should be
applauded wholeheartedly. But for universities to truly
consider themselves leaders in global health, and to be
true to their mission, they should look also to how effec-
tively their research agenda is translated to innovations
useful to society.
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